8. Nine Variations
Text
English translation
Original Chinese text
孙子曰:凡用兵之法,将受命于君,合军聚众。圮地无舍,衢地合交,绝地无留,围地则谋,死地则战。途有所不由,军有所不击,城有所不攻,地有所不争,君命有所不受。故将通于九变之利者,知用兵矣;将不通于九变之利,虽知地形,不能得地之利矣;治兵不知九变之术,虽知地利,不能得人之用矣。
English translation
Sun Zi says that a commander receives the ruler's command and then gathers and aligns troops.
Unstable ground is not a place to stay; a main-crossing is suitable for concentration; a cut-off area is not a place to linger;
surrounding an enemy must be prepared first, and in a trapped situation one must fight decisively.
Not every route is passable, not every force should be attacked, not every city needs to be taken, and not every order is followed unchanged.
One who understands the Nine Variations can use war; one who cannot, even with good terrain knowledge, cannot gain its benefit, and cannot make people effective.
The section shifts the focus from static terrain labels to adaptive control. The command challenge is choosing when to act and when not to act.
Original Chinese text
是故智者之虑,必杂于利害,杂于利而务可信也,杂于害而患可解也。是故屈诸侯者以害,役诸侯者以业,趋诸侯者以利。
English translation
A wise planner must weigh profit and risk together. Pursuing gain without building trust makes plans unreliable, while seeing only harm without remedies increases trouble.
Hence rulers are bent with fear of loss, engaged through manageable tasks, and drawn near through benefits.
The text frames military influence as calibrated governance. Different levers—pressure, duty, and incentive—are selected according to context.
Original Chinese text
故用兵之法,无恃其不来,恃吾有以待之;无恃其不攻,恃吾有所不可攻也。
English translation
In war, do not rely on the enemy staying away; rely on your ability to meet him.
Do not rely on the enemy not attacking; rely instead on what you have that cannot be easily attacked.
This is a readiness doctrine. A strong force is defined by resilience and response, not by assumptions about opponent inertia.
Original Chinese text
故将有五危:必死,可杀也﹔必生,可虏也﹔忿速,可侮也﹔廉洁,可辱也﹔爱民,可烦也。凡此五者,将之过也,用兵之灾也。覆军杀将,必以五危,不可不察也。
English translation
A commander faces five risks: if he insists on dying, he may be killed; if he clings only to survival, he may be captured; if he is quickly angry, he is easily provoked against;
if he is overly rigid and self-righteous, he can be humiliated; if he is overly protective of the people, the command can be burdened and disrupted.
These are excesses of command and become disasters in war. When an army collapses and a general is lost, these risks are usually involved.
Personality is not outside strategy. Leadership bias can itself become a battlefield variable that weakens operational control.